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DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF TAX AND WELFARE POLICIES: COVID-
RELATED POLICIES BUDGET 2021
 
*Karina Doorley, Claire Keane, Alyvia McTague, Seamus O’Malley, 
Mark Regan, Barra Roantree, Dora Tuda1 
ABSTRACT 
In this article, we assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on unemployment 
in Ireland and estimate how family incomes have changed as a result of increased 
unemployment, calibrated to administrative sources for end-August. We then 
show how the direct and indirect tax and welfare measures enacted prior to 
Budget 2021 have helped to cushion pandemic-related income losses. Lastly, we 
assess the impact of Budget 2021 measures.  
 
We find that pandemic-related unemployment could have decreased household 
income by an average of 7 per cent across the population, with significantly larger 
losses for those who lost their jobs. Thanks to the initial policy response in the form 
of the PUP, wage subsidy and standard rate VAT cut, household income fell instead 
by 3 per cent on average. These losses are sharpest at the upper end of the income 
distribution, for the young, and for those in certain hard-hit sectors such as 
hospitality. The impact of Budget 2021, while less costly than the pre-budget 
measures, is similar in pattern, with above average gains for the bottom two-fifths 
of the income distribution and lower than average gains for those at the upper end.  
 
Without these interventions, income inequality would have increased 
substantially. Instead, our simulations suggest that the COVID-related 
interventions stabilised disposable income inequality, a significant feat given the 
job losses experienced. At risk of poverty rates were also stabilised by COVID-
related policies but there is a risk that these indices may increase significantly once 
these supports are withdrawn. We conclude with some brief reflections on some 
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In the Budget delivered to the Dáil on 13 October, the Minister for Finance and the 
Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform announced plans for General 
Government expenditure in 2021 of €109.2 billion, a €21.9 billion (25 per cent) 
increase from its pre-pandemic 2019 level. This is to be financed by €88.7 billion of 
General Government revenue and borrowing, with a General Government deficit 
of €20.5 billion planned for 2021.2 
 
The majority of additional Departmental expenditure has been allocated to the 
Department of Health – reflecting increased healthcare costs and additional 
demands arising from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic – and the Department of 
Social Protection. While most of the latter reflects increased claims for welfare 
payments rather than an increase in the generosity of these payments, the Budget 
announced changes that will leave welfare spending €510 million higher and taxes 
€265 million lower than they otherwise would have been.3 
 
These measures come in addition to the substantial changes made earlier in 2020 
to the direct tax and benefit system and indirect taxes. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has resulted in huge employment losses in 2020, with the Government responding 
by introducing two new financial supports: the Pandemic Unemployment Payment 
and the Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme. A cut to the standard rate of VAT was 
also enacted in advance of the Budget package.  
 
Using representative survey data linked to SWITCH, the ESRI’s tax and benefit 
microsimulation model and ITSim, the ESRI and Department of Finance indirect tax 
tool, this article assesses these reforms. We first look at the cost and distributional 
effect of pandemic-related unemployment, where this is calibrated to the latest 
available figures at end-August 2020. We then assess how pre-budget COVID 
income supports and Budget 2021 affect these.4  
 
We find that pandemic-related unemployment could have decreased household 
income by an average of 7 per cent across the population, with significantly larger 
losses for those who lost their jobs. Thanks to the initial policy response in the form 




2  See Table 11 of the Budget 2021 Economic and Fiscal Outlook, available at http://budget.gov.ie.  
3  See Chapter 10 of Budget 2021 Expenditure Report, available at http://budget.gov.ie.  
4  This analysis focuses on pre-budget direct and indirect tax and welfare measures and Budget 2021. It excludes 
measures announced at the end of October 2020 which increased the level of PUP and EWSS in response to the 
introduction of Level 5 restrictions.  
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by 3 per cent on average. These losses are sharpest at the upper end of the income 
distribution, for the young, and for those in certain hard-hit sectors such as 
hospitality. The impact of Budget 2021, while less costly than the pre-budget 
measures, is similar in pattern, with above average gains for the bottom two-fifths 
of the income distribution and lower than average gains for those at the upper end.  
 
Without these interventions, income inequality would have increased 
substantially. Instead, our simulations suggest that the COVID-related 
interventions stabilised disposable income inequality, a significant feat given the 
job losses experienced. At risk of poverty rates were also stabilised by COVID-
related policies but there is a risk that these indices may increase significantly once 
these supports are withdrawn. We conclude with some brief reflections on some 
of the challenges facing the government in the coming years. 
 
2. SCENARIOS 
This analysis uses SWITCH, the ESRI’s tax benefit model and ITSim, the indirect tax 
microsimulation tool jointly developed by researchers at the ESRI and the 
Department of Finance. SWITCH is run on data from the 2017 Survey of Income 
and Living Conditions (SILC), the primary source of information on household 
incomes collected annually by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The scale, depth 
and diversity of this survey allows it to provide an overall picture of the impact of 
the policy changes on Irish households, which cannot be gained from selected 
example cases. ITSim estimates the indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties, including 
carbon taxes) paid by Irish households on the basis of their reported expenditure, 
collected by the CSO’s nationally representative Household Budget Survey (HBS) in 
2015-2016.5 There are three stages to our analysis which rely on four scenarios. 





5  Incomes are uprated to 2020 levels using earnings growth, and expenditures are uprated to 2021 levels using forecasts 




TABLE 1  SCENARIOS 
Scenario Data Tax-benefit policy system 
Pre-COVID 2017 SILC with incomes uprated to 2020 
levels 
February 2020 direct and indirect tax and 
welfare policies, indexed by forecast price 
growth between 2020 and 2021 
COVID - no policy 
response 
2017 SILC with incomes uprated to 2020 
levels and COVID-related job loss 
calibrated to end-August 2020  
February 2020 direct and indirect tax and 
welfare policies, indexed by forecast price 




2017 SILC with incomes uprated to 2020 
levels and COVID-related job loss 
calibrated to end-August 2020 
September 2020 direct and indirect tax and 
welfare policies, indexed by forecast price 
growth between 2020 and 2021 
COVID - Budget 
2021 
2017 SILC with incomes uprated to 2020 
levels and COVID-related job loss 
calibrated to end-August 2020 




Given the substantial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment, we first 
adjust the 2017 data in order to be representative of the 2020 population in terms 
of unemployment rates. A proportion of workers in each industry are assumed to 
have either lost their job or to have been put on the Employment Wage Subsidy 
Scheme (EWSS). The number of individuals to either lose their job or receive the 
EWSS is calibrated from publicly available data from the CSO on the number of 
people in receipt of the Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) and the 
Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS, the predecessor to EWSS). Both 
calibrations are done using end-August figures, the latest available at the time of 
writing, and account for the industry and age breakdown of recipients of either 
scheme.6 The data are also adjusted to take account of income growth between 
2017 and 2020.7  
 
We then use SWITCH to calculate households’ social welfare entitlements, tax 
liabilities and net incomes under our baseline policy. This indexes the policy rules 
in place in February 2020 by forecast inflation of 0.2 per cent8 between 2020 and 
2021 to provide a benchmark that holds welfare payments, tax credits and 
thresholds constant in real terms.9 Comparing this scenario (COVID – no policy 
response) to one in which there is no unemployment shock (Pre-COVID) shows in 




6  COVID-19 Adjusted Monthly Unemployment Estimates by Age Group, Lower and Upper Bound, Month, Statistic and 
Sex. https://statbank.cso.ie/px/pxeirestat/Statire/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?maintable=MUM02&PLanguage=0. 
7  For example employment income is uprated by 1.12 using data from the CSO and the ESRI Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, and self-employment income is uprated by 1.04 using both data from the CSO and national income 
forecasts in the ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary.  
8  As per the Central Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin, Q3. 
9  While these rules could alternatively be indexed by forecast wage growth to provide a more distributionally neutral 
benchmark, no such forecast was available given the uncertainty associated with the ongoing pandemic. See Callan et 
al. (2019) for a discussion of indexation options and the associated issues they raise. 
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for the offsetting effect of lower tax payments and higher social welfare 
entitlements (so called ‘automatic stabilisers’).  
 
In the second stage, we incorporate three major policy changes made between 
March and September 2020 in response to the pandemic. 
1. The Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) was announced on 15 March 
at a rate of €203 per week, increased to €350 per week following an 
announcement on 24 March. The generosity of the PUP was gradually 
decreased so that, by September 2020, recipients received either €203, €250 
or €300 per week, depending on their pre-pandemic earnings. It is this version 
of the PUP that we model in SWITCH. Although reduced from its initial flat rate 
of €350, the PUP is still more generous that the standard personal rate for 
Jobseekers’ supports. The PUP is closed to new applicants from January 2021 
while the payment itself will be discontinued in Spring 2021.  
2. On 19 March, the Minister for Social Protection introduced the Employer 
Refund scheme by which employees could remain on company payrolls while 
receiving the amount of the COVID-19 Support Payment, the cost of which 
would be reimbursed to relevant businesses. This scheme was superseded by 
the Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) from 26 March, allowing 
employers to claim subsidies of up to €410 per week for eligible employees 
they retain on payroll. The TWSS was replaced on 1 September by the 
Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme (EWSS) which provides a two-tier subsidy 
of €151.50 or €203 per employee to employers who have suffered a loss in 
turnover of at least 30 per cent. This scheme will remain in operation until 
Spring 2021. As our focus in the COVID – September policy response scenario is 
on the tax-benefit scheme in place just preceding the budget, it is the EWSS 
that is examined in the analysis that follows.  
3. As part of the July Stimulus, the standard rate of VAT was cut from 23 per cent 
to 21 per cent from September 2020 until February 2021 to aid a wide range 
of economic activities. 
 
This scenario, COVID – September policy response, is compared to the COVID – no 
policy response scenario in order to show the cost and distributional effect of these 
supports.10 A key assumption in this stage of the analysis is the number of jobs 
supported by the EWSS that would have been lost in the absence of this policy 








would have been lost in the absence of this policy measure11 but, in the next 
section, we show how sensitive our estimation of the cost of the pandemic income 
supports is to this assumption.  
 
In the third stage of the analysis, we incorporate changes announced in Budget 
2021. The elements of Budget 2021 that we model consist of changes to direct 
taxes, indirect taxes and social welfare payments which we list in Appendix A and 
briefly detail here.  
 
Although most tax credits and bands were frozen in cash terms – amounting to a 
small effective tax increase given forecast inflation of 0.2 per cent – some cuts to 
direct taxes on personal income were announced. The point that the main rates of 
Universal Social Charge (USC) and class A employer pay related social insurance 
(PRSI) begin to apply were increased slightly while a reduced rate of USC for 
Medical Card holders was extended by a year. The earned income tax credit (EITC) 
available to self-employed workers was also increased (by €150 to €1,650 per year) 
meaning that most self-employed will now pay the same income tax as employees 
with the same level of earnings.12 
 
There were more substantial reductions in indirect taxes, with a temporary 
14-month cut in the rate of VAT charged on hospitality and hairdressing (from 
13.5 per cent to 9 per cent) and cash freezes (small effective cuts) in alcohol duties. 
However, there were also increases in tobacco products tax (equivalent to an extra 
50 cents per pack of 20 cigarettes) as well as a well-flagged rise in the carbon tax 
(from €26 to €33.50 per tonne).13 
 
While the main rates of most social welfare benefits were frozen in cash terms, 
there were some substantial targeted increases to payments, in part informed by 
ESRI research on how lower income households could be best compensated for a 
rise in the carbon tax (O’Malley et al., 2020). Low income retirees and single adults 
living alone gained from increases to the Living Alone Increase and Fuel Allowance: 
36 per cent and 14 per cent respectively. Low income families with children gained 




11  We have arbitrarily chosen the halfway point, 50 per cent, as it is not possible to know what the true figure is.  
12  The incomes of self-employed workers will continue to be subject to higher rates of USC above €100,000 per year but 
benefit from more favourable PRSI treatment than the earnings of employees (Roantree et al., 2018). The Budget also 
announced the extension of various direct tax reliefs for companies and first-time buyers of newly built homes, none 
of which are incorporated in our analysis given the focus is on household incomes. 
13  There were also changes to the way that cars registered from January 2021 will be taxed, both on registration in the 
form of Vehicle Registration Tax (VRT) and recurrently (motor tax). However, we do not model either of these changes 
as our SILC data do not contain sufficiently detailed information on car ownership.  
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payments, One-Parent Family Payment or Working Families Payment. In addition, 
there were increases to the amount that recipients of One-Parent Family Payment 
and Disability Allowance could earn before seeing their payment means-tested, 
and to the Carer’s Support Grant paid annually to those in receipt of the Carer’s 
Allowance, Carer’s Benefit and Domiciliary Care Allowance.14  
 
Comparing outcomes in the COVID – September policy response and COVID – 
Budget 2021 scenarios gives the additional cost and distributional effect of the 
direct and indirect tax and welfare measures announced in Budget 2021, compared 
to a price-indexed version of the September 2020 tax-benefit system. 
 
3. COST 
Table 2 displays the monthly cost of pandemic-related unemployment, of the 
accompanying supports in operation as of September 2020 and of Budget 2021.  
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show the cost of pandemic-related unemployment, 
calibrated to match August 2020 levels, under two assumptions: (1) no jobs 
supported by the EWSS would have been lost in the absence of this policy and 
(2) 50 per cent of jobs supported by the EWSS would have been lost in the absence 
of this policy. The net Exchequer impact of the pandemic unemployment shock 
ranges between -€341 million and -€745 million depending on how EWSS is 
treated. In our central scenario (in column 2), where 50 per cent of jobs supported 
by EWSS would be lost without this policy intervention, the loss in Exchequer 
revenues of €745 million per month is almost equally driven by a reduction in 
tax/SIC revenue (-€365 million per month) and an increase in welfare expenditure 
(+€380 million per month).  
 
Comparing this scenario to one in which the PUP and EWSS are introduced in 
column 3 shows a larger loss in Exchequer revenue of €831 million per month. It is 
notable however, that much of this Exchequer loss would have been experienced 
in the absence of these policies, assuming that the EWSS is saving 50 per cent of 
the jobs it supports. Even if we assume that the EWSS is saving no jobs, close to 
half of this Exchequer loss would have been experienced (see net Exchequer 
impact of -€341 million per month in column 1). This is because, in the absence of 
the PUP and EWSS, the existing tax-benefit system would have helped stabilise 
incomes, for example through increased Jobseeker’s Benefit or Assistance 




14  There was also a postponement of the planned rise in the qualifying age for the State pension, which we do not model. 
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the Exchequer cost of COVID-related unemployment, although it is likely that their 
marginal cost is significantly less than this, depending on how crucial the EWSS is 
to job retention.  
 
The effect of Budget 2021, in column 4, is to slightly increase the monthly 
Exchequer cost, primarily through an increase in welfare expenditure. 
 
TABLE 1 THE COST OF COVID-19 RELATED EMPLOYMENT IN TERMS OF DIRECT TAX AND 
WELFARE 
 Cost (€million per month) 
  

















Change in earnings -503 -1,080 -778 -778 
(a) Change in tax/SIC revenue -173 -365 -277 -276 
(b) Change in welfare expenditure 168 380 335 345 
     Pandemic Unemployment Payment 0 0 272 270 
(c) Employment Wage subsidy scheme 0 0 219 219 
Net Exchequer impact (a-b-c) -341 -745 -831 -839 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels. 
Notes: (1) no direct/indirect tax or welfare policies implemented. Assumes no jobs supported by the EWSS would have been lost in the 
absence of this policy.  
(2) no direct/indirect tax or welfare policies implemented. Assumes 50 per cent of jobs supported by the EWSS would have been 
lost in the absence of this policy. 
(3) direct and indirect tax and welfare policies implemented up to September 2020. 
(4) direct and indirect tax and welfare policies announced in Budget 2021. 
 
4. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT 
Figure 1 shows the distributional effect of pandemic-related unemployment with 
and without accompanying supports and Budget 2021 measures. We first examine 
the impact of pandemic job losses without targeted supports on income 
distribution (COVID – no policy response). We then turn to the effect of the PUP, 
EWSS and cut to the standard rate of VAT on household income (COVID – policy 
response) before showing the cumulative effect of these supports and Budget 2021 




FIGURE 1 DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT LOSSES WITH AND WITHOUT SEPTEMBER 
COVID POLICIES AND BUDGET 2021 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using ITSim linked to the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey uprated to 2021 prices, and SWITCH run on 
2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels.  
Notes:  Quintiles are based on equivalised household income, using CSO national equivalence scales. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of each scenario across the distribution of household 
income, adjusted for family size, with the population divided into five equally sized 
groups (quintiles) ordered from lowest- to highest income, left-to-right. We 
estimate that pandemic-related unemployment has decreased household income 
by 7 per cent. However, this loss is not equally distributed. Households in the 
lowest quintile group saw little change to their income as (1) they are less likely to 
contain a worker and to be exposed to the unemployment shock and (2) the 
existing tax-benefit system (e.g. Jobseeker’s Benefit, Jobseeker’s Assistance etc.) 
does a good job of sheltering the incomes of those in this income quintile from job 
losses. Losses increase further up the income distribution with those in the upper 
half of the income distribution experiencing the largest income loss of between 
7 per cent and 9 per cent. 
 
The initial policy response to the pandemic (PUP, EWSS and cut to the standard 
rate of VAT) decreases the average household income loss from 7 per cent to 3 per 
cent. Households in the lowest two income quintiles experienced small income 
gains compared to a Pre-COVID scenario as a result of the generous rate of PUP 
and the cut to the standard rate of VAT. This phenomenon is also highlighted in 
Beirne et al. (2020), which examines the distributional effect of the more generous 





























Covid - no policy response Covid - September policy response Covid - Budget 2021
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Only quintile five still experiences large average income losses of 6.5 per cent 
compared to a Pre-COVID scenario.  
 
Figure 1 also shows the additional effect of Budget 2021 on income distribution. 
Budget 2021 reinforces the trend of the pre-Budget income support policies but 
the magnitude of the effect of Budget 2021 is small compared to the impact of 
employment losses or policies enacted earlier in the year. Figure 2 shows the effect 
of Budget 2021 policy changes alone, distinguishing between direct tax and welfare 
and indirect tax measures. Direct tax and welfare measures result in an average 
increase in disposable income of 0.2 per cent compared to the price indexed 
benchmark. Gains are higher in the lower half of the distribution and are close to 
zero in quintiles four and five, reflecting low rates of social welfare receipt in these 
quintiles. Indirect tax measures result in a negligible increase in disposable income, 
on average, compared to price-indexed policies with the reduction in VAT more 
than offsetting the rise in carbon tax and tobacco duty for most households. 
However, the effect is not uniform and there are small losses at the bottom of the 
income distribution in addition to the small gains at the top of the distribution. 
Taking direct and indirect measures together results in an overall picture of a 
progressive budget, largely driven by the substantial increases to certain welfare 
payments for low income retirees, families with children and adults living alone.  
 
FIGURE 2 BUDGET 2021 COMPARED TO INDEXED SEPTEMBER 2020 POLICY PARAMETERS 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using ITSim linked to the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey uprated to 2021 prices, and SWITCH run on 
2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels.  












Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 All




The impact of the pandemic has not been uniform across different groups of the 
population. Inequalities have been observed by income group, age, gender and 
industry (Adams-Prassl, et al., 2020; Alon et al., 2020; McQuinn, et al., 2020). There 
are also suggestions that the pandemic will result in longer-run effects on 
inequality in income, health, human capital, etc. (Blundell et al., 2020). In this 
section, we show estimates for income inequality and at risk of poverty rates in the 
four scenarios presented above. We also add to the international evidence on the 
unequal effect of the pandemic and show how short-run pandemic-related income 
losses vary by age cohort, gender and industry in Ireland. To do this, we examine 
income at the individual level rather than the family level (discussed in Section 4). 
This necessitates some assumption about how income is split between members 
of a couple. 
 
5.1 Income inequality and at-risk of poverty rates 
Table 3 shows our estimates of income inequality and at risk of poverty rates in the 
four scenarios described above. Income inequality is measured using the widely 
used Gini Index. An increase in this index indicates that income is distributed more 
unequally. At risk of poverty rates are measured with respect to a poverty line 
equal to 60 per cent of median equivalised household income.15  
 
Inequality in market – or pre-tax and transfer – income is 0.51 in the Pre-COVID 
scenario, rising to 0.56 when we account for COVID-related job loss without any 
policy response. The initial policy response reduces this to 0.53 and inequality 
remains at this level in the COVID – Budget 2021 scenario. The Gini of disposable – 
or post-tax and transfer – income is 0.28 in the Pre-COVID scenario. This rises to 
0.29 (+4 per cent) when COVID-related job losses are introduced. The initial policy 
response to COVID and tax-benefit changes in Budget 2021 stabilise the Gini of 
disposable income at 0.28 and 0.27 respectively. This pattern of a predicted rise in 
inequality in the absence of policy intervention and a stabilisation once policy 
changes are taken into account is not unusual compared to our European 
neighbours. Almeida et al., 2020 estimate that in the absence of policy responses, 
the COVID pandemic would have resulted in an average rise in the Gini of 3.6 per 
cent across the European Union but a small fall is estimated (-0.7 per cent) once 





15  The CSO’s equivalence scale is used. 
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TABLE 3  INCOME INEQUALITY AND AT RISK OF POVERTY RATES 
 Pre-COVID 









Income inequality     
Gini Market Income 0.51 0.56 0.53 0.53 
Gini Disposable Income 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.27 
At Risk of Poverty rate     
Anchored Poverty rate 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.15 
Anchored Poverty rate - working age 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.16 
Anchored Poverty rate - child 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.19 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels. 
The at risk of poverty rate is calculated based on a poverty line equal to 60 per cent of median equivalised disposable income. 
The CSO equivalence scale is used. Working age defined as aged 18-65 and children those under age 18.  
 
The at risk of poverty rate rises from 0.14 in the Pre-COVID scenario to 0.18 in the 
COVID – no policy response scenario. There are rises of similar magnitudes for 
working age and child subgroups. The direct and indirect tax and benefit reforms 
introduced as part of the COVID policy response cushion most of this increase and 
Budget 2021 continues in the same direction, so that at risk of poverty rates in the 
COVID – Budget 2021 scenario are little higher than those in the Pre-COVID 
scenario. 
 
While the COVID polices in particular have done much to stabilise inequality and 
the at risk of poverty rate, these scenarios indicate how inequality and poverty may 




Figure 3 shows the change in disposable income by age cohort compared to the 
Pre-COVID scenario.16 Clearly the youngest age cohort is most affected by income 
losses due to COVID-related unemployment. We estimate that the 18-29 cohort 
would have lost 15 per cent of disposable income in the absence of targeted 
supports. This is twice the average loss of 7 per cent observed across all age 
cohorts. However, the policy response to COVID-related job losses has been such 




16  Income is at the individual level rather than the tax-unit level which necessitates some assumption about how income 
is split between members of a couple. We consider each member of a couple as an individual in terms of their market 
income, tax liability and benefit entitlement. One exception is family benefits, such as child benefit, and household 
level benefits, such as housing benefits, which we assume to be shared equally among members of a couple. 
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This implies that the COVID policies are doing most to support the incomes of 
young adults.  
 
FIGURE 3 IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT LOSSES, DIRECT TAX AND WELFARE POLICIES AND BUDGET 
2021 BY AGE 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels. 
To individualise income, household level benefits are split equally between members of a couple.  
 
5.3 Gender 
Figure 4 shows how income losses are distributed by gender, comparing the 
scenario COVID – Budget 2021 to the scenario Pre-COVID. Men are more likely to 
be in employment, pre-COVID, than women and, when they are in employment, 
they tend to have higher average earnings. In line with this, we estimate that men 
lose, on average, more disposable income than women as a result of the pandemic. 
This should be interpreted as a short-term effect as there is evidence in the 
international literature that, in order to cope with increased caring responsibilities, 
women have been more likely than men to switch from employment to inactivity 
or to decrease their hours of work during the pandemic (Adams-Prassl, et al., 2020; 
Alon et al., 2020; Andrew et al., 2020). Neither of these effects are captured by our 
method and they are likely to have knock-on effects on the gender wage gap and 
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FIGURE 4 THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT LOSSES, DIRECT TAX AND WELFARE POLICIES AND 
BUDGET 2021 BY GENDER 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels. 
To individualise income, household level benefits are split equally between members of a couple.  
 
5.4 Industry 
Figure 5 shows the aggregate change in disposable income of workers by industry. 
Before accounting for the PUP and EWSS, those most affected by income losses 
are those working in Hotels and Restaurants and Other, which includes the Arts. 
The policy response to unemployment losses has greatly sheltered the income 
losses for those working in these industries in particular. In the absence of 
economic recovery in these industries, the withdrawal of these policies, scheduled 
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FIGURE 5 THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT LOSSES, DIRECT TAX AND WELFARE POLICIES AND 
BUDGET 2021 BY INDUSTRY 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels. 
To individualise income, household level benefits are split equally between members of a couple.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
2020 has been a challenging year for employment and incomes in Ireland and has 
proved a severe test of the social welfare system. Significant interventions have 
been made by the Government to support the incomes of those affected financially 
by COVID-19 in the form of the Pandemic Unemployment Payment and wage 
subsidies. In addition the standard rate of VAT was reduced over the summer from 
23 per cent to 21 per cent to help bolster economic activity.  
 
If these initial interventions had not happened, we estimate that pandemic-related 
unemployment would have decreased household income by an average of 7 per 
cent across the population, with significantly larger losses for those who lost their 
jobs. The initial policy response in the form of the PUP, wage subsidy and standard 
rate VAT cut helped protect family incomes and reduce the cost of living so that 
household income fell instead by 3 per cent on average. These losses are sharpest 
at the upper end of the income distribution. At 6 per cent, those in the highest 
income quintile experience a loss more than twice the average. Those in the lowest 
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cut to VAT and the relative generosity of the PUP compared to prior earnings of 
this group.  
 
We estimate that, in the absence of targeted policies, young adults in the 18-29 
age category would have experienced a particularly large loss in income of over 
14 per cent due to COVID-related job losses. The initial interventions acted to 
reduce this to around 5 per cent, similar to that experienced by older age groups. 
Those working in certain hard-hit sectors – hospitality, for example – would also 
have faced significantly above average falls in income. Again, the initial COVID-
related policies ensured these losses were greatly reduced.  
 
Without these interventions, inequality in market (pre-tax and transfer) income, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, would have risen by close to 10 per cent. Instead, 
our simulations suggest it rose by less than half of that, just under 4 per cent. Once 
taxes and transfers are taken into account the COVID-related interventions actually 
completely stabilised disposable income inequality, a significant feat given the job 
losses experienced. At risk of poverty rates were also stabilised by COVID-related 
policies but there is a risk that they may increase significantly once these supports 
are withdrawn.  
 
While much less costly than the pre-Budget COVID policies, Budget 2021 was also 
progressive in its impact, with above average gains for the bottom two-fifths of the 
income distribution and lower than average gains for those at the upper end. We 
estimate that Budget 2021 will result in small reductions in income inequality and 
the at risk of poverty rate.  
 
There is much debate over how long to continue COVID-related policies such as the 
PUP and EWSS. While pandemic-related unemployment is costly to the Exchequer 
in terms of tax foregone and welfare expenditure, this research has shown that at 
least half (and probably more) of this cost would have been incurred in the absence 
of the COVID policies.  
 
The PUP is due to be continued until April 2021 but closed to new applicants at 
end-2020. Should sufficient employment prospects exist at that time, withdrawing 
the PUP would improve financial incentives for those seeking work to take up 
employment. So too would allowing existing recipients to maintain their payment 
while taking up paid employment for a period of time, as is the case with the self-
employed. This could encourage those in non-viable industries to seek 
employment in other sectors, for which they may need additional training. 
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However, if the labour market has not largely recovered by Spring of 2021, then 
the withdrawal of the PUP would be likely to disproportionately affect low-income, 
young, single workers. This group is particularly at risk of a large income shock for 
two reasons. Firstly, those aged 18-25 living with parents receive a rate of 
Jobseeker’s Assistance that is 45 per cent lower than the rate for those aged 25 
and above.17 Secondly, many young people receiving the PUP are students so may 
not be eligible for Jobseeker’s Assistance in the first place.18 One option available 
to policymakers is a more gradual tapering of the PUP which could help the groups 
most at risk of long-term unemployment after the pandemic to maintain a certain 
standard of living while searching for work. Much will depend on the post-COVID 
recovery and the availability of employment for different age cohorts and in 
different sectors.  
 
Similarly, determining the optimal time to close or withdraw the EWSS – currently 
end-March 2021 – will be challenging. In the long-run, continuing the subsidy 
would mean supporting both employment which would exist even if the subsidy 
was no longer in place (a deadweight cost) and employment which is no longer 
viable in the long term (where employees should be given the opportunity to 
re-train in other roles). Yet withdrawing it too early would lead some firms to fail 
that would otherwise be viable. While close monitoring of the speed and scale of 
the recovery by sector may help inform this difficult decision, there is also a case 
for examining the design of the subsidy for any it does continue for. At present, the 
sharp cut-off in eligibility imposed by the requirement to be experiencing a 30 per 
cent reduction in turnover means some firms may face an incentive to suppress 
output, therefore inhibiting their recovery.  
 
Finally, men appear to have been hardest hit by employment losses in the short 
term, driven by the fact that they are more likely than women to be in employment 
in the first place and tend to have higher earnings. However, in line with the 
international evidence, female participation rates and hours of work in Ireland may 
have changed over the course of 2020 due to child and elderly care pressures. Such 
pandemic-related career interruption may have a knock-on effect on gender gaps 
in earnings and work patterns in the future, which policymakers may wish to 




17  The personal rate of Jobseeker’s Assistance for those aged 18-25 not living independently and with no dependent 
children is €112.70 per week compared to €203 a week for those aged over 25. 
18  It is estimated that in October 2020 at least 25 per cent of PUP recipients aged under 25 were registered as a full-time 
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The SWITCH model provides a detailed and accurate representation of almost all 
aspects of the Irish personal tax and benefit system. It does not include taxes on 
businesses (like corporation tax), which are difficult to assign to individual 
households, or expenditure on public services which, unlike cash transfers 
provided through the benefit system, are conceptually difficult to assign a value to 
(O’Dea and Preston, 2014).  
 
The ITSim model estimates the indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties, including 
carbon taxes) paid by Irish households on the basis of their reported expenditure, 
collected by the CSO’s nationally representative HBS in 2015-2016. 
 
The main measures we include in our analysis of Budget 2021 using SWITCH are 
given in Table A1. 
 
TABLE A1 MAIN MEASURES IN BUDGET 2021 USING SWITCH 
Income Taxes EITC increase 
USC second rate increase 
Social Welfare 
Carer’s support grant increase 
Living Alone Allowance increase 
Fuel Allowance increase 
QCI changes 
OPFP earnings cap removal 
Working Family Payment increases 
Disability Allowance disregard increased 
Indirect Taxes 
Carbon tax increase 
VAT reduction for hospitality/tourism 
Tobacco tax increases 
 
 
